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INTRODUCTION
Perceived corporate dominance has spurred a recent populist backlash, on
both the political left and political right. In this atmosphere, the Supreme
Court's 2oo decision in Citizens United v. FEC,' granting corporations the right
to spend directly on express political advocacy, has become the target of a par-
ticularly heated critique.
This Essay confronts the impact of Citizens United in two respects. Part I
first reviews Citizens United's place in the campaign finance constellation. It ar-
gues that although the decision was a bold stroke in many ways, its impact on
the scope of permissible campaign finance regulation is far less substantial than
commonly assumed.
Even if Citizens United's incremental impact is mild, it nevertheless has the
feel of a final straw. The decision has provoked first furor, and then fear, with
opponents invoking images of a dystopian political process overwhelmed by
corporations. Yet rarely is the fear of corporate political spending articulated at
a level of specificity conducive to assessing, or confronting, the perceived dam-
age. Part II takes up that challenge, parsing the concerns at the root of opposi-
tion to corporate political spending.' It then offers responsive policy proposals,
all well within the regulatory space undisturbed by Citizens United.
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I would like to thank
Ellen Aprill, Heather Gerken, Rick Hasen, Katie Pratt, Cameron Schroeder, Ted
Seto, and the editors of the Yale Law & Policy Review for helpful comments and
suggestions. All errors, of course, are my own.
1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (zoo).
2. This Essay leaves aside the robust debate about corporate governance structures'
capacity to ensure that corporate political spending is in the interest of the appro-
priate stakeholders. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate
Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARv. L. Rv. 83 (2oo); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy,
Corporate Campaign Spending: Giving Shareholders a Voice, BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE (June 7, 2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/page//publications/
shareholdersvoice2_5_io.pdf; Adam Winkler, "Other People's Money": Corpora-
tions, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871 (2004). Instead, it
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I. THE SURPRISING LIMITS OF CIzzNs UNITED
Citizens United is written to be a big opinion, offering bold constitutional
pronouncements with thin evidentiary support, and scoffing at both previous
Courts and coordinate federal branches. Its aggressive posture and sweeping
language have stirred scholars and practitioners ale, in fields far beyond its
holding.3
Curiously, however, Citizens United may be as momentous a change in
campaign finance law when compared to other decisions of the Roberts Court.4
This Part first considers those other cases, which inspired less frenzy but
represented larger seismic shifts. It then considers Citizens United itself, and the
comparatively incremental increase in political speech the decision actually
permits.
A. Earlier Cases of the Roberts Court
As with all modern campaign finance stories, it is necessary to begin with
1976's Buckley v. Valeo.5 Buckley concerned a challenge to the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)6 : extensive campaign finance legislation capping
both contributions to candidates (contributions) and spending on elections
(expenditures). The government defended the law as necessary to prevent cor-
ruption-and the appearance of corruption-in the federal political process.
Buckley upheld FECA's limits on contributions as suitably tailored to the gov-
ernment's important objectives but found its corollary limits on expenditures to
be unjustified constraints on the ability to create and distribute core political
speech.' After Buckley, candidates, driven to outspend opponents and indepen-
dent entities in order to promote their preferred narrative, were soon consumed
in an "arms race" for campaign funds.
focuses on the feared repercussions of corporate political spending that exist even
when internal governance procedures ensure that managers' incentives are per-
fectly aligned with those of the corporation's stakeholders.
3. En route to overturning precedent and nullifying a congressional statute, the deci-
sion raises or revives serious questions about, inter alia, Supreme Court practice,
tax law, corporate governance, commercial speech, the role of empirical data in
electoral jurisprudence, and the relative utility of facial and as-applied challenges.
See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, log MIcH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 24-25), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=162o576 (cataloguing concerns about the Citizens United decision).
4. The claim that Citizens United represents relatively limited doctrinal change is de-
scriptive, not normative; there is much in the decision to critique, but such analy-
sis is beyond the scope of this Essay.
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
6. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
7. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
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Fast-forward to the Roberts Court. In Randall v. Sorrell, the Court was, for
the first time, meaningfully presented with expenditure limits premised on a
different government interest-one that actually arose out of the "arms race":
the need to prevent fundraising from draining time that legislators spend legis-
lating and executives spend executing.' A plurality of the Court curtly dismissed
this interest-and implicitly, any others---on the grounds that Buckley's invali-
dation of expenditure limits could not be undermined, even by a presumably
legitimate novel interest supported by presumably legitimate evidence.9 Two
years later, in Davis v. FEC, the Roberts Court confronted the supply side of the
"arms race," invalidating a provision relaxing contribution limits for candidates
whose wealthy self-financed opponents spent beyond a given threshold.o The
opinion is most significant in concluding that a wealthy candidate's ability to
speak would be burdened, despite the absence of limits or restrictions on that
speech, by rules fostering the speech of others." That novel theory has inaugu-
rated a wave of judicial attacks on public campaign financing programs.
Randall and Davis are watershed decisions, distinctions of kind rather than
degree. The first categorically refused to consider novel forms of harm to the
political system; the latter wholeheartedly embraced a novel form of harm to
political plaintiffs. Moreover, both cases rejected-and possibly doomed-
efforts to change the fundamental nature of the fundraising "arms race". Ran-
dall refused to consider any regulatory interest in shutting it down, and Davis
attacked perhaps the most effective means of coaxing it to a close. In contrast,
as this Essay next explains, Citizens United represents only an incremental
change, turning up the volume of speech already in the political marketplace.
B. Corporate Speech Before Citizens United
Citizens United did not introduce constitutional protection for the speech
of incorporated entities." Before Citizens United, the Court had expressly
8. 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (per curiam).
9. Id. at 245-46 (plurality opinion).
10. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
n. Id. at 2769, 2771-72.
12. Most of these programs, though structured differently from the provision invali-
dated in Davis, allow one candidate's spending to "trigger" additional disburse-
ments to an opponent. See Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279 (iith Cir. 2010); Green
Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 20o0); McComish v. Bennett, 611
F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), stayed pending cert. decision by 13o S. Ct. 3408 (U.S. June
8, 2010) (No. 09-A1163).
13. This Essay treats the speech of incorporated entities as distinct from the speech of
corporate managers, employees, and shareholders acting through a separate se-
gregated fund. The latter may share a corporate affiliation, but represent their
own interests rather than the interests of the corporate entity.
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granted for-profit corporations First Amendment rights to fund commercial
speech,1 4 and had never questioned corporate rights to speak accurately on non-
commercial subjects outside of the electoral arena. 5
Within politics, federal regulations and many states' regulations had long
prohibited corporations from spending their general treasury funds on election-
related communications. Cases before Citizens United, however, cut these regu-
lations to the bone. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti granted corpora-
tions the right to spend unlimited treasury funds to support or oppose ballot
initiatives." FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. extended that right to political
messages mentioning candidates, so long as they did not amount to express
"vote for or vote against" advocacy or its "functional equivalent." 7
These cases gave for-profit corporations ample lawful opportunity to sup-
port or critique candidates quite vigorously." Prior to the Citizens United deci-
sion, corporations had the constitutional right to spend unlimited funds telling
voters that "Candidate Smith hates puppies." Citizens United only added pro-
tection for these corporations to convey an incremental "Vote Smith Out" ex-
hortation, expressly encouraging citizens to act at the ballot box on their as-
sessments of candidates. This is a relatively minimal final straw.'9
C. Regulation After Citizens United
Better said, Citizens United invalidated the federal ban on corporations'
ability to advocate expressly for or against political candidates, but it did not
portend the complete collapse of other campaign finance regulation. For exam-
ple, beyond the perceived audacity of the opinion, Citizens United gives no rea-
son to question regulation of direct contributions to candidates. Limits on po-
litical expenditures are presumptively invalid because they have a direct impact
on the expression of the spender's ability to produce and distribute its own
speech, and, in the Court's eye, at best have a tangential relationship to prevent-
14. See Centr. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
15. See, e.g., Heffron v. Int'l. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
16. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
17. 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2oo7).
18. Certain corporate entities enjoyed more extensive rights to advocate for or against
candidates directly. Some nonprofit corporations, organized in order to "dissemi-
nate political ideas," received this right in FEC v. Mass, Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238, 263-64 (1986), and the Court consistently assumed that for-profit media cor-
porations, organized in order to profit by their speech, had similar rights. See, e.g.,
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
19. Nate Persily, Citizens United: A Preview to a Post-Mortem, BALKINIZATION (Jan.
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ing perceived corruption of officeholders.2 0 Neither flaw infects limits on con-
tributions-suitcases of cash delivered to candidates or their representatives
have limited inherent speech content and a much greater perceived relationship
to misconduct." And while candidates and parties might protest their loss of a
competitive advantage in a system in which corporations and millionaires
spend billions on some candidates, while other candidates may only raise mon-
ey in bite-sized chunks,' the Roberts Court seems to have no interest in eva-
luating contribution limits based on the degree to which they provide a level
playing field." Davis forecloses any argument that wealthy corporations' entry
into the political marketplace creates a legal right for candidates or parties to
amass the cash to keep up. 4
Regulations requiring disclosure of the financial backing of political com-
munications appear to be even more secure. Eight Justices gave their approval
to fairly extensive disclosure requirements in Citizens United," absent evidence
of "a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals.""'
20. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897-98, 908-n (2010).
21. Id. at 9o-o2, 908-o9, 914-15; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976); see also In re
Cao, No. 10-30080, 2olo WL 3517263, at *9 (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 2010) ("[W]e do not
read Citizens United as changing how this court should evaluate contribution lim-
its on political parties and PACs."). Even if the Court were to invalidate absolute
prohibitions on corporate giving, those contributions would still be capped at
$2400. See Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 133
(2oo); Price Index Increases for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and
Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 74 Fed. Reg. 7435 (Feb. 17, 2009). On the
current Court, only Justices Scalia and Thomas appear ready to scrap limits on
contributions entirely. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 265-67 (2006) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring in the judgment); cf McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 301-03
(2008) (Kennedy, J.) (finding a sufficient interest in limiting contributions to
candidates, but not to parties).
22. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, No. 09-1287, 2oo WL 1653051, at *2o-22
(U.S. Apr. 23, 2010) (jurisdictional statement).
23. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (emphatically rejecting any interest "in equa-
lizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of
elections").
24. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773-74 (2008). Of course, candidates and parties
are the engines of most campaign finance regulation; given the newly enhanced
comparative advantage of independent entities, incumbents may now be more in-
terested in repealing existing restrictions. That would be a tactical choice, howev-
er, and not a doctrinal limitation.
25. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914-16; cf id. at 98o (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
26. Id. at 916 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S at 198); see also John Doe No. i v. Reed, 130 S.
Ct. 2811, 2820 (2010) (noting the same standard in the context of disclosures with
respect to ballot proposition petition signatures).
221
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
This is not to suggest that Citizens United creates no campaign finance rip-
ples. For example, the Court repeatedly insists that the First Amendment does
not distinguish speech based on the speaker. 7 As Professor Rick Hasen dis-
cusses, there is no principled way to take this precept seriously and still main-
tain a prohibition on expenditures by unions," or more controversially, foreign
entities. 9 Expect Non-Citizens United in the near future.
The decision also creates questions about other corporate electoral funding,
short of gifts to candidates.30 The principal expenditure at issue in Citizens
United was a movie about a candidate; the Court allowed corporations to pro-
duce such communications because of the core speech the communications
comprise. Federal law, however, prohibits corporate payments to influence elec-
tions beyond such paradigmatic speech.3' For example, corporations may not
fund partisan voter registration drives.3 And it is not clear whether corpora-
tions may funnel money to other entities that wish to advocate for or against
candidates." The extent to which Citizens United speaks to these payments-
whether these are, in terms of the relative speech interests of the corporate en-
terprise or the marketplace of ideas, more like expenditures beyond regulatory
27. 130 S. Ct. at 899, 902-03, 905-11; id. at 919, 921-22 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at
928-29 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. In the days after Citizens United, the FEC announced that it would not enforce the
federal ban on expenditures by unions. Press Release, Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC
Statement on the Supreme Court's Decision in Citizens United v. FEC (Feb.
5, 2010), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2o1o/201oo2o5CitizensUnited
.shtml.
29. Hasen, supra note 3 (manuscript at 4, 25-32); see also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135, 148 (1945) (noting that First Amendment protections extend to resident non-
citizens). If a critical interest in corporate political speech is informing the electo-
rate, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907, there are surely American voters who would
want to consider foreign citizens' views on American candidates' approaches to
matters like foreign relations, international trade, or international security.
30. See supra text accompanying note 21. When electoral activity is coordinated with
candidates, it is treated not as independent expression, but as a gift to the candi-
date, like any contribution. See ii C.F.R. § og.2o et seq (2010). With corporate
money freed for independent spending but not spending that is coordinated with
candidates, there will likely be an increase in scrutiny on the "independence" or
"coordination" of corporate political spending.
31. 2 U.S.C. § 432(9)(A) (2006).
32. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(9)(B)(ii), 442b(b)(2)(B); ii C.F.R. § 1144(d)(3) (2010).
33. The Federal Election Commission recently permitted such payments with respect
to federal candidates, FEC Advisory Op. 2010-ni, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
(July 22, 2010), http://saos.nictusa.com/saoslaonum.jsp?AONUM=20o-u, but
whether such payments must be allowed as a constitutional matter is hotly dis-
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power or more like contributions susceptible to regulation-is uncertain. Still,
in all, these are relatively minor uncertainties, atop a relatively minor increase
in corporate speech rights.
II. PARSING THE FEAR OF CORPORATE EXPENDITURES
So why has Citizens United provoked so much sound and fury? The popul-
ist environment, hostile to generic corporate interests of many kinds, surely
plays a part. So does the case's aggressive procedural approach,34 and its sweep-
ing rhetoric, both of which seem to poke a finger in the eye of those who disag-
ree with the legal merits.
Perhaps most important in the decision's outsized aura, however, is the fact
that in eliminating the ban on corporate express advocacy, Citizens United elim-
inated the final extant prohibition on independent corporate political speech.
The case has thereby taken on the perceived sins of the whole line of decisions
expanding corporate rights in the political marketplace. More specifically, Citi-
zens United has provoked such a strong reaction because it stands for a series of
opinions that, together, allow the potential for corporate speech to overwhelm a
democratic system built to serve individual voters.
Careful parsing of this reaction reveals that it has several components, sel-
dom articulated. For example, limited forays into campaign advocacy-a bill-
board or two, say-by small incorporated nonprofit organizations or local for-
profit businesses do not provoke the same degree of concern that the demos is
endangered. These concerns, therefore, do not seem to be predicated on the
corporate form as such. Rather, most of the fear provoked by Citizens United
seems to be driven by the anticipated actions of entities with exceptionally con-
centrated wealth. 5 Attention is focused on corporations, because the corporate
form allows for-profit corporations to amass such wealth at an unsurpassed
scale.
Understanding that the furor over Citizens United concerns the political le-
verage of extreme wealth, rather than the corporate form as such, usefully nar-
rows the field of responsive policy to address that concern. Parsing further, to
understand the reasons why citizens may be worried about the deployment of
extreme wealth in the political marketplace,36 yields a still narrower field of pol-
icy responses. This Essay turns now to the particular fears that may be at the
34. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 931-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. E.g., Donna F. Edwards, Response to Democracy After Citizens United, BosToN
REv., Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 23-24 ("The Citizens United ruling will go down in histo-
ry as one of the Supreme Court's worst decisions-the Dred Scott of our time.").
36. Some concerns about corporate speech are nonconsequentialist, finding fault in
the mere fact that corporations are speaking, or the fact that entities have different
capacities for disseminating speech, apart from any impact that that speech may
have on the campaign marketplace or political process. This Essay focuses, in-
stead, on the tangible impact of the speech authorized by Citizens United.
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heart of the reaction to Citizens United-and once articulated, finds several tai-
lored responses to these fears well within the regulatory space undisturbed by
the decision itself.
A. Corporations will completely dominate political communication in a par-
ticular race, squeezing out alternatives.
Call it the "all in" scenario: ExxonMobil decides to spend its $45 billion of
annual net income7 on a few pivotal races, not only blanketing but smothering
the available fora.
It is important to remember that even Exxon-esque wealth cannot truly
preclude alternative speech. In the extremely unlikely event that a single entity
or consortium managed to purchase all of the available advertising space in the
relevant television, radio, newspaper, and billboard markets, it would still be
virtually impossible for that entity or consortium to dominate all news and edi-
torial content, and impossible for a single interest to dominate distributed me-
dia like the Internet, direct mail, or person-to-person communication.
Nevertheless, the (unlikely) prospect that one corporate entity or consor-
tium might purchase effective control of any single medium might justify regu-
latory intervention calibrated to prevent monopolization of a channel of the
marketplace of ideas, just as government may prevent monopolization of a
channel of the commercial marketplace. As just one example, such regulation
might prevent a single entity, or entities acting in concert, from consuming
more than x percent of the available space within a given medium in a given pe-
riod.
Such an approach is not at odds with Citizens United. The decision ad-
dressed, and rejected, regulation premised on the assertion that incremental
corporate speech is inherently harmful, no matter how much or how little of
the available bandwidth that speech consumes. The Court has displayed a mar-
kedly different approach in circumstances when speech is recognized as zero-
sum, and the government is interested not in prohibiting speech categorically,
but in regulating individual speakers' use of a medium to preserve the diversity
of the marketplace of ideas. Specifically, the Court has given the government
broad latitude to ensure the health of a limited-capacity medium at risk from
too many simultaneous speakers. For the same reasons, it should show the
same solicitude for regulation preventing one speaker from monopolizing any
given channel.39
37. ExxoNMoBnI, 2008 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2008), available at http://
www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Files/news-pub sar_2008.pdf.
38. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680-82 (1998);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574, 576 (1941).
39. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-90 (1969); Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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This approach also steers well clear of the interest, thoroughly denigrated in
Buckley, Davis, and Citizens United, in equalizing speech or leveling electoral
opportunities. Individuals and entities would remain differently able to distri-
bute speech based on their differential wealth. Rather than aiming toward
equality, the anti-monopolization concern polices the boundaries of the ex-
treme in a manner designed to preserve diversity. Moreover, unlike campaign
finance regulation applied only to political speech, the anti-monopolization
proposal above, triggered by a particular entity's consumption no matter what
the nature of the speech, would also be content-neutral.
B. Corporations will spend enough on speech to cause voters to elect the can-
didate preferred by the corporations.
This is one articulation of the "distortion" that corporate speech is said to
create: Disproportionate corporate spending will cause citizens to follow the
money, making the "wrong" choice. When unpacked, this argument entails a
descriptive claim that a sufficiently large quantum of speech is not only one fac-
tor among many in influencing voter choice, but that it is decisive-and a nor-
mative claim that such a decisive impact is troublesome.
This Essay leaves aside the descriptive claim; a substantial body of work at-
tempts to isolate the drivers of voter choice and their relative impact, and the
degree to which campaign speech "matters" in that calculus is contested.4o Ra-
ther, assuming that corporate campaign speech may be decisive, this Essay
probes the comparatively neglected normative concern. Corporate spending
might cause voters to change their minds. So what?
Presumably, there is no normative objection to speech that is decisive be-
cause it persuades based on an accurate idea assessed by the voter on the merits,
no matter how large the quantity of that speech. Such a decision process fits a
platonic ideal of the marketplace of ideas-and is likely vanishingly rare.
Instead, there are at least three potentially controversial ways in which a
substantial quantity of candidate-focused speech might cause a voter to change
his or her mind.
First, voters may use heuristics that fail them. The breadth of support for a
given proposition, if a proxy for majoritarian merit, may legitimately factor into
voters' election choices. 4' But if voters employ a heuristic equating quantity of
speech with breadth of support, great volumes of corporate speech might cause
40. See, e.g., Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth of the Level Playing Field: Knowledge, Affect,
and Repetition in Public Debate, 75 Mo. L. REV. 143 152-64 (2010).
41. The electorate may use breadth of support for a communication ("support Smith
because he will cut taxes") to gauge the truth or fiction of an assertion (people
agree that "Smith will cut taxes"), its normative value (people agree that "it is
good that Smith will cut taxes"), or the salience of a topic overall (people agree
that a "candidate's approach to taxes is a good issue for evaluating candidates").
Any of the three may cause a decisional "error" if there is not broad support for
that communication.
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voters rationally seeking a bandwagon to follow a bandwagon that does not ex-
ist.42
Second, even more basic cognitive processes might lead to error. When
voters do not consciously evaluate the relative merit of arguments at first hear-
ing, repetition alone may provide the arguments with unwarranted force or af-
fective resonance remarkably difficult to dispel.43 Millions of dollars of corpo-
rate speech might therefore cause voters to put more faith in the arguments
than those arguments "deserve," simply by virtue of the repetition.
Third, theoretically, a substantial mass of speech might simply amount to
an unstoppable electoral force. That is, the first two concerns above suggest that
sheer quantity has an impact only in the lacunae of cognitive evaluation. In
contrast, some commentary concerning the impact of corporate spending sug
gests a fear that money is its own destiny, no matter how much thought
voters are prepared to give to their vote.44
Because the first two propositions, at least, are premised on cognitive er-
rors, additional information might mitigate the concern. In campaign finance
regulation, the case for such information often involves requirements to dis-
close the financial support for speech.
Current disclosure regimes, however, are generally poorly tailored to the
task. Even when focused on particular communications, disclosure usually in-
volves detailed reporting of individual contributions to a centralized source.45
Such compilations are far too complex for most voters to assess the breadth of
support for any given message.46 Moreover, by the time that voters seek out the
relevant information, it is far too late to dislodge the conclusions reached by the
basic mental shortcuts in question.
42. Cf Ronald Dworkin, The Decision That Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, May 13, 2010, at 63 (articulating the concern that "(clorporate advertising
will mislead the public... because its volume will suggest more public support
than there actually is for the opinions the ads express").
43. See Sheff, supra note 40, at 153-54, 160-63.
44. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 4.
45. See, e.g., Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections
(DISCLOSE) Act, H.R. 5175, S. 3628, imth Cong. § 211 (2010).
46. Moreover, such models may have substantial countervailing privacy concerns. See
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures on Disclosure, 45 IND. L. Rrv. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 28-30), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1622760 (recom-
mending disclosure of "only certain, non-identifying information for smaller con-
tributors" to reduce the risk of harmful retaliation); see also Richard Briffault,
Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.o, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273 (forthcoming 2010) (manu-
script at 276, 300-01) (on file with author) (recommending limited disclosure for
donors of small amounts, to maintain privacy and reduce the need for observers
to sift through information with little meaningful incremental value).
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A new-and far more basic-model of
disclosure focused on particular communica- Democracy Facts
tions may be far more promising. Consider a
few simple elements designed to appear, in
standardized form, within a communication Paid by People for GoodThing
itself: a sort of "Nutrition Facts" label for de- Supporters 12,345
mocracy. Such a label would signal the impor- $fromTop5 63%
tance of the information it contains, as well as
provide the information itself. This, in turn, G Washington
would improve the chance that voters pay at- John Adams
tention, increasing the cognitive processing Thomas Jefferson
they devote to the message and weakening the John Q. Adams
hold of fallible heuristics.47  America, Inc.
For example, "Democracy Facts" disclai- Candidate Authorized No
mer emphasizing simple proxies for the quan-
tity and fervor of local support for a particular the number of financial supporters for
communication might help flag the existence this communication within the
of a false bandwagon. This Essay suggests two )urisdiction of the candidate mentioned _
rough metrics of local support, though others may be at least as suitable. For
any given electoral communication, the number of financial supporters within
the jurisdiction is one relevant measure of quantity.48 The portion of financial
support generated by the top x contributors is one relevant measure of relative
47. See Sheff, supra note 40, at 163-64 (suggesting that "greater attention to the se-
mantic content of a message" and "more in-depth cognitive processing" may mi-
tigate the pure effect of repetition).
48. The number of supporters might include those funding the particular communi-
cation, or if such earmarked contributions do not cover the communication's
costs, those otherwise funding the sponsoring entity and presumably agreeing
with its speech.
Identifying the number of supporters requires a further refinement. Imagine
that two hundred people give to PeopleForGoodThings, which joins twelve cor-
porations giving to PeopleForGreatThings, which joins one organization giving to
PeopleForExcellentThings, which distributes an electoral communication. How
many entities have financially supported the final piece of speech in a way that re-
flects the strength of the bandwagon?
One technique would trace financial backing to "ultimate source donors"-
that is, entities like individuals or corporations that are not themselves funded
primarily by ideological donations. A tangential benefit of this technique is that it
aligns the incentives of speaking entities with the difficulty of collecting informa-
tion for disclosure. Any entity that wishes to magnify the impact of its speech, by
speaking on behalf of a broader base of individuals, will have an incentive to trace
the ultimate donor base more vigorously. Each organization will be able to weigh
for itself the costs and benefits of increased information processing against the
costs and benefits of the perception that it is speaking for a limited number of lo-
cals.
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fervor.49 These are both, of course, measures of financial support for a commu-
nication, and therefore only second-best measures of popular support for the
propositions that a communication asserts. Still, they are at least useful flags.
While millions of people may support a proposition funded by a handful, a
large quantity of speech sponsored by just a few entities should alert voters to
question the validity of their quantity-based heuristic, and seek more informa-
tion to test the proposition's breadth of support.
A "Democracy Facts" disclaimer may also help mitigate the second concern
above-that communications receive unwarranted weight based on repetition
alone. Here, the focus is on information revealing potential conflicts of interest,
which may prompt voters to test their assumption of accuracy. Knowing the
identity of those supporting a communication might help voters better calibrate
the initial weight they believe the communication is worth, before repetition
has the opportunity to solidify its presumed reliability. Some will credit the
communication based on the sponsor's identity, while others will discredit it;
either reaction is legitimate-and richer than an assessment based on quantity
alone.
As above, the value of this disclaimer does not depend on identifying all
supporters. Instead, the real value inheres in the identity of the "but-for spon-
sors," the primary sources of funding for the speech in question, without whom
the speech likely would not exist, or would take on a different character."o Iden-
tifying the top x contributors should be sufficient.?
The "Democracy Facts" disclaimer may mitigate the effect of the two cogni-
tive errors described above." Citizens United's express support for more exten-
49. More precisely, the value inheres in identifying the amount of financial support
from the top x direct contributors, as a percentage of the total financial support
from supporters within the jurisdiction.
50. This information also provides a tangential benefit. Outside of the election con-
text, unattributed speech may be rebutted over time. In an election campaign of
finite duration, however, any rebuttal may arrive only after the campaign is over.
Effective disclosure of the real, continuing entities primarily responsible for a
communication-"stand by your ad" provisions-may chill flatly false speech by
ensuring some continuing locus of reputational responsibility for the communi-
cation after the campaign.
51. Cf Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections
(DISCLOSE) Act, H.R. 5175, S. 3628, i1th Cong. § 214(b)(2) (2010) (requiring dis-
closure of, inter alia, the "Top Five Funders" of a communication); Mayer, supra
note 46 (manuscript at 16-17, 31) (suggesting disclaimers identifying the most sig-
nificant contributors). In order to preserve the ability of dissenting supporters to
dissociate themselves from a given communication, it may suffice to exclude from
the "top x" list those general organizational supporters who specify that their sup-
port is not to be used for a particular communication.
52. Critically, the claim here is not that disclosure, as a heuristic cue of its own, would
substantially increase the degree to which voters make informed final choices on
candidates. Cf Briffault, supra note 46 (manuscript at 288) (expressing skepticism
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sive disclosure certainly suggests that they would be legally upheld." Yet if the
third concern above-the sheer overwhelming force of quantity-is instead ac-
curate, there is little reason to believe that this, or any, disclaimer would make
any difference.
Fortunately, anecdotal evidence suggests that money is not entirely destiny:
When equipped with accurate disclosure, voters do not slavishly follow even
dominantly loud voices in the marketplace of ideas.54 For example, 2004 Cali-
fornia State Assembly candidate Tricia Hunter was favored 45 to i by indepen-
dent expenditures, but lost her election." Similar results have been seen in di-
rect democracy initiative campaigns: In 2oo, for example, Pacific Gas & Electric
was the primary source of $46.4 million supporting a California ballot proposi-
tion, against $133,000 in spending from opponents-and the measure went
down to defeat. Money may buy awareness, but even dominant corporate
spending cannot alone ensure electoral victory.
about such claims); Mayer, supra note 46 (manuscript at 11-13) (same). Rather, the
claim is far more modest: Disclosure might help to mitigate informational mis-
cues provoked by particular frequently repeated communications.
53. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914-16 (2010); supra notes 25-26 and ac-
companying text. Indeed, disclosure premised on the heuristics rationales dis-
cussed above presents a straightforward way to reconcile the Court's recent
paeans to disclosure with its vigorous protection of anonymous political speech of
the sort in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). In McIntyre, the
Court confronted a private citizen distributing handbills door-to-door. In such a
case, there is little danger that the recipient of the speech would misperceive a
bandwagon behind the message, or grant it increased credibility based on sheer
repetitive distribution.
54. Money is strongly correlated with political success. For example, candidates with
more contributions have won more than 80% of state races in the last few election
cycles (no single source seems to aggregate independent expenditures). See PETER
QUIsT, NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POL., THE ROLE OF MONEY &
INCUMBENCY IN 2007-2008 STATE ELECTIONS 7 (2010), available at http://www
.followthemoney.org/press/PrintReportView.phtml?r=423. It is exceedingly diffi-
cult, however, to disaggregate the extent to which fundraising success generates,
rather than is generated by, greater public support for the candidate than her rival.
BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
48-51 (2001).
55. See, e.g., CAL. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM N, INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES:
THE GIANT GORILLA IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE 30 (2008), available at http://www
.fppc.ca.gov/ie/IEReport2.pdf.
56. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: JUNE 8, 2010, STATEWIDE DIRECT
PRIMARY ELECTION 19 (2010), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/
20o-primaryfpdfl2olo-complete-sov.pdf; Campaign Contributions for Proposi-
tion 16, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, CALAccEss, http://calaccess.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/
Measures/Detail.aspx?id=1321695 (for contributions toward supporting Prop. 16,
follow hyperlink for all "Support" Committee Positions; then view information
for "Contributions Received"; for contributions opposing Prop. 16, follow hyper-
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C. Corporations will spend enough on speech favorable to the winning candi-
date that the candidate will support the corporation's interest at the ex-
pense of the interests of the electorate, in order to incur similar future sup-
port.
The concerns above address potential failures of the marketplace of ideas of
an election; this concern adds a failure of post-campaign governance? It de-
pends on a particular incarnation of the familiar public choice problem": A
corporation trades substantial expenditures for favorable legislation, which is
unremarkable when the legislation also benefits the voting constituency, and
pernicious when the broader constituency is harmed, particularly if the harm is
not sufficiently severe to provoke a collective response from the broader consti-
tuency. The exchange resembles quid pro quo corruption, except that it occurs
over several time periods and without an express agreement.59 It may also be
worrisome if officials and campaign benefactors are suspected to be engaged in
such a scheme, the mere appearance of which would degrade faith in the gover-
nance process, even if there is no such understanding.
The Citizens United majority flatly, and without empirical evidence, dis-
counted such exchanges as factual impossibilities."o Commentators have noted
that the Court's assessment contradicts its evaluation of very similar problems
in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.," which acknowledged the possibility in
judicial elections that even truly independent expenditures might, if sufficiently
sizable, spur judges to issue unwarranted decisions favoring the spending entity,
or at least create the appearance of such improprieties." While these analysts
link for all "Oppose" Committee Positions; then view information for "Contribu-
tions Received") (last visited Nov. 24, 2010).
57. See Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 8-9.
58. Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice
Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (1996). See generally,
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991).
59. Though an agreement increases the certainty of mutual benefit, explicit coordina-
tion is not necessary for sophisticated repeat players to understand-albeit per-
haps imperfectly-that their actions may be mutually beneficial.
6o. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908-o (2010).
61. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
62. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 3 (manuscript at 33-35). Indeed, one scholar has
branded such expenditures "Caperton contributions," recognizing the Caperton
Court's elision of "expenditures" and "contributions," as well as the potential of
such expenditures to corrupt. See James 1. Sample, Democracy at the Corner of
First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and Equality 6, 43 (Hofstra Univ.
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have correctly praised the value of Caperton's logic, they have thus far missed
the value of its remedy.
As a remedy for the potential bias created by particularly sizable expendi-
tures, Mr. Caperton sought not disgorgement of the expenditures, but recusal: a
limit on the judge-beneficiary's ability to provide a perceived return on the ex-
penditure sponsor's investment. It might be productive to consider such a solu-
tion in the legislative arena as well. Indeed, Professor John Nagle has suggested
that legislators be required to recuse themselves from significant action on is-
sues directly affecting campaign contributors. 3 Just as Caperton viewed sub-
stantial expenditures as equivalent to contributions, Professor Nagle's proposal
may warrant extension to substantial expenditures as well.
For example, in the event of an expenditure sufficiently outsized to gener-
ate unusual gratitude by a favored candidate, the winning candidate might be
presumptively ineligible to take legislative action unusually benefiting the spon-
sor of the expenditure in question.'4 This safeguard would be judicially unen-
forceable, since no voter has a cognizable right to force a legislator to vote or
abstain from voting on any given proposition. For precisely the same reason,
however, courts could not prevent legislatures from themselves enforcing such a
recusal obligation against their own members as an internal ethics matter,6
Some may protest that such a "legislative recusal" obligation, extended to
outsized expenditures, would unduly interfere with a legislator's ability to act in
the interest of her constituents. After all, if recusal is tied to contributions, a
candidate can control the obligation by rejecting any given contribution-but
candidates have no such control over third-party expenditures. And a corpora-
tion vigorously supporting a candidate might thereby eliminate the candidate's
ability to benefit the corporation in ways that also benefit the remainder of the
constituency.
63. John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 69 (2000).
64. This example adds an element to Professor Nagle's proposal beyond its extension
to expenditures. In Nagle's proposal, a substantial contribution creates a recusal
obligation for any matter affecting the contributor. See id. at 81. This creates the
opportunity for strategic contributions: An entity contributes to a candidate likely
to vote against that entity's interest, in order to force recusal. The same opportu-
nity would apply to expenditures: Corporations might favor unopposed candi-
dates or those likely to win by vast margins, in an attempt to force recusal of those
inclined to act against the corporations' interests. Limiting the recusal obligation
to legislative actions deemed to substantially benefit the outsized campaign bene-
factor avoids this potential.
65. Cf id. at 86-87 (suggesting internal congressional enforcement of the recusal obli-
gation). As with all proposals above, this suggestion leaves unresolved questions,
including the percentage of a campaign's expenditures amounting to an "out-
sized" quantum, the size of a benefit that amounts to "substantial," and the body
that might be charged with deciding both, ex ante or ex post. For this Essay, it suf-
fices to introduce the concept.
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Credible ex ante commitment to "legislative recusal" should align incen-
tives to limit this concern. If legislation sought by private interests also benefits
the constituency as a whole, there is no reason for the private interests to spend
at levels designed to attract a candidate's special gratitude; because of the bene-
fit to the constituency, the private interest can count on natural support for the
legislation in question (with, say, an extra bit of lobbying oomph). Therefore,
the private interest will tailor its spending to avoid anomalous support trigger-
ing the "legislative recusal" obligation, ensuring the legislator's continuing abili-
ty to act on the favored measure. Only legislation that does not inure to the
broader public benefit would be worth campaign spending sufficient to capture
the legislator's attention; and only such spending would trigger the recusal obli-
gation.
Credible pre-commitment to "legislative recusal" may also mitigate a dif-
ferent manifestation of this public choice problem that is more difficult to
detect. For-profit corporations may spend large campaign sums to curry legisla-
tive favor. But they can also extort favored policy outcomes by merely threaten-
ing to support the opposition.66 A recusal commitment might modestly increase
legislative backbone to withstand such a threat. If a corporation sought favora-
ble legislation by threatening to deliver overwhelming support to a campaign
opponent, recusal would also disable the opponent from yielding the desired
benefit if he or she should win a corporate-fueled campaign. The recusal rule
would decrease the corporation's incentives to spend in outsized quantities, re-
ducing the size of the threat.
There are limits to recusal's ability to address rent-seeking behavior
through the reality or threat of substantial expenditures; none of the proposals
in this Essay is a panacea. For example, the analysis above presumes corporate
interest in passing favorable legislation; the recusal rule would have little impact
if the corporation wished instead to block legislation, because replacing a disfa-
vored decisive "yes"-vote with a competitor precluded from voting is often just
as effective as securing a "no"-vote. Moreover, a legislator might influence pas-
sage of a measure at numerous stages, even without the ability to take formal
legislative action-for example, by persuading a colleague or colleagues to act.
Still, if the corrupting potential of expenditures on the legislative process is not
judicially cognizable after Citizens United, legislators' ability to tie themselves to
the mast, however limited, may be the best means to address a serious public
choice concern.
D. Corporate spending will unduly divert incumbents' time from their
governmental duties to raising funds.
This concern reflects another impact of political spending on governance. It
assumes that candidates will want to control the political narrative and will not
66. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 335 (4 th Cir. 2008) (Mi-
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be content to leave campaign speech to third-party proxies: The greater the vo-
lume of competing expenditures, the more pressure candidates will feel to
spend time fundraising in order to deliver their own messages. And the more
time that incumbent candidates spend fundraising, the less they will have avail-
able to perform their existing legislative obligations well.'' This concern is the
reason why Randall and Davis are so important; Randall refuses to acknowledge
this rationale for regulating the amount of money that incumbents could spend
time fundraising," and Davis calls into question the ability of public financing
schemes to adequately support incumbents who do not spend their time fun-
draising.'9 Meanwhile, eliminating contribution limits might relieve some of
the time constraints above, but unlimited contribution opportunities raise the
serious countervailing concern of quid pro quo corruption.
There is no question that direct corporate political spending will raise the
scale of the arms race that candidates perceive themselves to be in, and will raise
candidates' anxiety about the need to close any fundraising gap. In the short
term, particularly if public funding does not meet a perceived gap, it is likely
that incumbents, feeling pressure from corporate spending, will increase the
time they spend fundraising and decrease the time they spend legislating. Per-
versely, however, if that gap becomes sufficiently large, there is an-admittedly
Pollyannaish-possibility that it will channel candidates' political engagement
in a productive direction.
If corporations pursue political speech with sufficient gusto, there may
come a point at which candidates simply cannot raise enough money to pur-
chase a volume of speech that "competes" with the volume of non-candidate
speech, no matter how much time they spend attempting to raise funds. In or-
der to promote the delivery of their message, then, candidates may have to turn
to methods that rely more on volunteer effort than purchased advertisement. 70
These more personal contacts-door-to-door canvassing, phone, mail or email,
67. See, e.g., George Packer, The Empty Chamber, NEW YORKER, Aug. 9, 2010, at 38. At
some level, deficient performance will threaten incumbents' reelection more than
a fundraising gap. This is not an assertion that incumbents will completely aban-
don their governmental duties, but rather that incremental fundraising time has
an opportunity cost for the quality of government.
68. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 245-46 (2006).
69. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008); supra note 12. Davis does not jeopardize
public financing schemes like the Fair Elections Now Act, S. 752, inth Cong.
(2009), which rely exclusively on matching private contributions, and do not trig-
ger consequences based on third-party expenditures. The efficacy of such schemes
in an environment of unlimited corporate independent expenditures, however, is
still unclear.
70. See John Salyer, TV Ads CANNOT Make the Difference, CHICO TEA PARTY PA-
TRIOTS (Sept. 28, 2010, 11:34 PM), http://chicoteaparty.ning.com/profiles/blogs/tv-
ads-cannot-make-the (claiming that TV advertising time for certain races is no
longer available, and soliciting funds for grassroots activity).
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generated by volunteers-are also more interactive than more expensive me-
thods of message delivery, creating the conditions for a more robust political
dialogue than television ads produce. Unlikely as it may seem, if Citizens United
ultimately leads corporations to price candidates out of mass media, the deci-
sion's lingering unintended consequence might be the enrichment of the politi-
cal marketplace.
CONCLUSION
Outsized political spending by wealthy corporations may create legitimate
concerns for the democratic process. But just as the outsized rhetoric of Citizens
United glosses over thorny issues within the case 71 opponents' outsized rhetori-
cal response 2 obscures both the real tangible concerns raised by corporate po-
litical spending and their potential responses. Confronting the true impact of
Citizens United requires a more focused lens. The analysis and proposals
above-part policy prescription and part thought experiment-are offered as
contributions to that scholarly project.
71. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
72. E.g., Edwards, supra note 35.
234
29:217 2010
